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Abstract
Models of social learning feature either binary signals or abstract signal struc-
tures often deprived of micro-foundations. Both models are limited when analyzing
interim results or performing empirical analysis. We present a method of generating
signal structures which are richer than the binary model, yet are tractable enough
to perform simulations and empirical analysis. We demonstrate the method’s us-
ability by revisiting two classical papers: (1) we discuss the economic significance
of unbounded signals [12]; (2) we use experimental data from [2] to perform econo-
metric analysis. Additionally, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for
the occurrence of action cascades.
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The literature of social learning focuses on the question “Why do people often em-
ulate the actions of predecessors, even when those actions contradict their own private
information?”. The canonical model of Banerjee [4], and of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer
and Welch [5], provided a simple and intuitive answer: “when the history is sufficiently
skewed against her private information, a rational agent’s optimal action is to ignore it
and follow the history.” They do so by presenting a model in which agents, who receive
a noisy private signal over an underlying state of nature, are called to act sequentially.
Agent signals are binary, and their quality is commonly known. Each agent sees the
actions of previous arrivals, updates her belief over the space set, using the information
revealed by this action history, and chooses the action which maximizes her expected
utility. Due to this elegant, yet simple, model, they show that in any game trajectory,
at some point, agents will follow in the footsteps of those who precede them, even if, a
priori, their signal favors the other action. These models generated great interest from
both experimental economists, trying to construct information cascades in a lab (see [2]),
as well as from econometricians, trying to estimate the effect of social learning on field
data (see [13]). The main challenge facing those practitioners originated from the binary
signal structure. In those models, a cascade emerges whenever the number of agents
who took one action exceeded those who took the other by two. To circumvent this the-
oretical limitation, researchers resorted to attempting to estimate “trace evidence” for
the occurrence of cascades (see [13]), assuming agents make mistakes ([2]), or assuming
that agent valuation for both actions fluctuates (see [8]). All these methods violate the
simple intuition mentioned above.
A second wave of research on social learning originated from Smith and Sørensen
[12]. In those models, the signal structure is assumed to be abstract. Their focus is often
on the asymptotic efficiency of the public belief convergence process. If the public belief
converges to an interior point (as in the binary models), then an information cascade
occurs. If the convergence is to either zero or one, then learning occurs. Smith and
Sørensen [12] contributed two major results to the discussion: (1) For learning to occur,
one requires that for every history, there will always be a positive chance that the agent
will choose a contrary action (a condition they call unbounded signals), otherwise an
information cascade occurs in finite time. (2) They distinguished between an information
cascade (i.e., convergence of the public belief to an interior point) and an action cascade
(i.e., at some point the agent chooses an action with probability one). Herrera and
Hørner [11] present a condition for the occurrence of information cascades, when the
domain is compact and the information structure satisfy several technical conditions. In
Section 2.1 we show that the condition does not hold in the general case and present a
counterexample.
Smith and Sørensen [12]’s results generated great interest among theoreticians at-
tempting to challenge it in various information structures (see [1]), agent utility func-
tions (see [7]), or market structures (see [3]). However, the vast majority of those results
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focus on asymptotic analysis, and often struggle to provide economic insight on agents’
short-term behavior.
In this work we attempt to bridge this gap by presenting a method to generate signal
structures which are richer than the binary signals models, yet are more tractable than
the abstract signal models. Therefore our method can be used both to perform empirical
analysis while maintaining the core intuition of information cascades, and to construct
examples which convey economic short term behavior, thus supplementing theoretical
research. As an additional theoretic contribution, we present a necessary and sufficient
condition for the occurrence of action cascades in general signal structures.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we present our model. In Section
2 we revisit the results of [12] and discuss its economic significance in the short term.
Section 2.1 contains our condition for action cascades. In Section 3, we demonstrate the
applicability of our method to econometric analysis by reverse engineering the experiment
of [2]. In Section 4, we conclude.
1 The Model
There are two possible states of nature, ω ∈ Ω = {0, 1}. The prior probability of the
realized state being 1 is denoted by Pr(ω = 1) = µ0. This prior probability is commonly
known, and is often dubbed the initial public belief. There is a countable set of agents
N. The set of available actions for agent t is At = A ≡ {0, 1} for all t ∈ N. Agent utilities
are determined by the realized state in the following manner,
ut(at) =


1 if at = ω
−1 if at 6= ω
.
Agents arrive sequentially by a predetermined order. Without loss of generality, we
denote each agent by her arrival time. That is, for all t ∈ N, we assume that agent t
arrives at period t. Each agent receives a private signal st ∈ S, where S is the set of
possible signals and is identical for all agents.
We follow Banerjee [4] and Bikhchandani et al. [5] and assume that the signal set
is binary, i.e. S = {0, 1}. Let qt = Pr(st = ω), where ω ∈ {0, 1} is the realized state of
nature. In the canonical models mentioned above, a common assumption is that qt = q
for every t. That is, the quality of all agent signals is the same. We diverge from this
assumption and assume that the signal quality qt is also private and is independently
drawn from a known set Q ⊆ [12 , 1], according to some distribution F (·). Note that F (·) is
not state-dependent and is commonly known. We denote by f the corresponding density
(if Q is a continuous sample space or PMF otherwise).
Agents observe all actions taken previously to their arrival. Let Ht ⊆ [0, 1]
t−1 denote
the set of possible action histories at time t, where H1 = {∅}. Let H = ∪t≥1Ht be the
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set of all finite histories, and H∞ = H ∪ {0, 1}
∞ be the set of all infinite histories.
A strategy for agent t is a measurable function σt : Ht × S ×Q→ ∆(A) which maps
every history to a decision rule. We denote a profile of agent strategies by σ¯ = (σt)t≥1.
A strategy profile σ¯, together with the information structure (S,Q,F ), and the initial
public belief µ0 induces a probability distribution Pσ¯ over Ω × H∞ × S
∞ × Q∞. We
define the public belief at time t, µt = Pσ¯(ω = 1|ht) as the probability that the state
is 1, conditional on the realized history ht before t’s action. Agents update their beliefs
using Bayes’ rule, and hence the expected utility of an agent for action a = 1 can be
written as,
ut(at = 1|st = 0, qt) =
µt(1−qt)
µt(1−qt)+(1−µt)qt
− (1−µt)qt
µt(1−qt)+(1−µt)qt
(1)
ut(at = 1|st = 1, qt) =
µtqt
µtqt+(1−µt)(1−qt)
− (1−µt)(1−qt)
µtqt+(1−µt)(1−qt)
(2)
This agent with st = 0 will play a = 1 whenever µt > qt. Similarly an agent with st = 1
will play at = 1 whenever µt > 1− qt.
As the value of qt is unknown to future arriving agents, calculating the updating
rule requires some work. To do so we use the distribution of signal qualities F to
derive a distribution over possible agent posteriors. For every pair st, qt we denote by
x(st, qt) = Pr(ω = 1|µ =
1
2 , qt, st). Note that for all agents other than t, x(st, qt) is a
random variable. We suppress the notation st, qt and let the agent type x be a random
variable describing agent t’s posterior belief whenever µt =
1
2 .
Let q¯ = supQ. Recalling the definition of quality qt = Pr(st = ω), x is a random
variable with support in [1− q¯, q¯] with the following state-conditional densities gω(·) for
state ω ∈ {0, 1},
g1(x) =


xf(x) if x ∈ [12 , q¯]
xf(1− x) if x ∈ [1− q¯, 12 ]
(3)
g0(x) =


(1− x)f(x) if x ∈ [12 , q¯]
(1− x)f(1− x) if x ∈ [1− q¯, 12 ]
(4)
and define Gω(x) =
∫ x
0 gω(z)dz, as the CDF of the state conditional distributions.
Note that for any quality distribution F, the ratio g1(x)
g0(x)
equals x1−x , thus increasing
in x. I.e., the type distribution exhibits the Monotone (increasing) Likelihood Ratio
Property (MLRP). By Bayes’ rule, agent t’s private posterior µ := Pr(ω = 1|ht, xt)
satisfies
µ
1− µ
=
µt
1− µt
g1(xt)
g0(xt)
=
µt
1− µt
xt
1− xt
and therefore the optimal strategy of agent t is a threshold strategy. That is, for every
µt, there exists x˜(µt) ∈ [1 − q¯, q¯] such that whenever x < x˜(µ), at = 0 and whenever
x > x˜(µ), at = 1. We denote µ
+
t := Pr(ω = 1|ht, at = 1) and µ
−
t := Pr(ω = 1|ht, at = 0),
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and formulate the updating rules as follows
µ+t+1
1−µ+t+1
= µt1−µt
1−G1(x˜(µt))
1−G0(x˜(µt))
(5)
µ−t+1
1−µ−t+1
= µt1−µt
G1(x˜(µt))
G0(x˜(µt))
(6)
Unlike the abstract signal structure of Smith and Sørensen [12], for a given F (·), µ0, and
Q, equations 5 and 6 can be used to calculate the updated public belief following any
finite length history ht = {a1, a2, . . . , at−1}.
In addition, Agent t, with type x, will play at = 1 whenever
x
1− x
>
1− µt
µt
An up-cascade occurs whenever µt > q¯ and a down-cascade occurs whenever µt < 1− q¯.
The cascade regions, unsurprisingly, are identical to those of the binary model of Banerjee
[4] and Bikhchandani et. al. [5]. The difference is in the time of convergence, i.e. in the
number of consecutive actions required to induce a cascade. In the following examples
we examine this aspect using several distribution families.
1.1 Example: Uniform distribution
To illustrate the uses of the method described above, we introduce a simple example.
Assume that qt ∼ U [
1
2 , q¯] for every t.
By equations (3) and (4) we can calculate the following distributions,
G1(x) =
∫ x
1−q¯
r
1
q¯ − 12
dr =


0 if x < 1− q¯
x2−(1−q¯)2
2q¯−1 if x ∈ [1− q¯, q¯]
1 if x > q¯
and
G0(x) =
∫ x
1−q¯
(1− r)
1
q¯ − 12
dr =


0 if x < 1− q¯
q¯2−(1−x)2
2q¯−1 if x ∈ [1− q¯, q¯]
1 if x > q¯.
Assume that µ0 =
1
2 , h3 = {1, 1} and q¯ =
2
3 . We can calculate agent thresholds in
the following way:
x1
1−x1
= 1⇒ x1 =
1
2 ⇒ µ
+ = 712 ⇒
⇒ x2 =
5
12 ⇒
µ++
1−µ++
=
1−G1(
1
2
)
1−G0(
1
2
)
1−G1(
5
12
)
1−G0(
5
12
)
⇒ µ++ = 91146 ≈ 0.623
⇒ x3 =
55
146 >
1
3
As shown in [4, 5], in the classic binary signal model, the public belief following every
history is determined by the initial public belief and the difference between the number
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of a = 1 and a = 0 taken. Whenever this difference is greater than two, agent actions
are no longer informative, thus a cascade occurs and µt+1 = µt. Note that here, unlike in
the case of the classical model with binary signals, after h3 = {1, 1}, agent 3 still plays
a = 0 with positive probability. This attribute makes possible more direct methods of
empirical analysis (as we show in Section 3), but also allows us to gain further insight
into the interim periods of the observational learning process, as we show in the following
section.
2 The Economic Significance of Unbounded Signals.
In their seminal work, Smith and Sørensen [12] generalized the game information struc-
ture from one in which the signals are binary to a structure in which abstract signals are
drawn from one of two state-dependent distributions. This extension provided important
insights into the governing forces of herding. Their first result stated that when the ini-
tial belief is not in the cascade region and signals are not discrete, information cascades
do not occur as the public belief never crosses into the cascade region, but converges
to its border. Their second result stated that despite the scarcity of information cas-
cades, the history of actions will “settle” on an alternative. They identified a necessary
and sufficient condition under which the public belief converges to the true state of the
world.
Smith and Sørensen classified the game information structure into bounded or un-
bounded beliefs. When signals are unbounded, at any public belief, and after any history,
there is always a positive chance that an agent will receive a signal strong enough to
induce a contrary action. In our model, this translates to q¯ = 1. In this section we revisit
their classic results using the example from Section 1.1.
In the table below we calculated the probability of a contrary action following a
history with an initial belief of 12 and a sequence of 1,2,4, and 8 consecutive actions for
several values of maximal signal quality q¯. One can see that when signals are unbounded,
the probability of a contrary action remains significant even after 8 consecutive actions.
In addition, note that when signals are bounded, the public belief stabilizes rapidly to
the border of the cascade region, yet it never crosses it. In addition, note that the effect
signal boundedness has on the process of social learning can best be witnessed when the
sequence of consecutive actions is sufficiently long. For example, when the history is
{0, 0}, the probability of a = 1 is roughly the same for all levels of q¯. However, when
h = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, the probability of a = 1, is greater by an order of magnitude,
from 0.0021 when q¯ = 0.55 to 0.0556 when q¯ = 1.
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µ0 =
1
2
h
q¯ = 0.55 q¯ = 0.66 q¯ = 0.77 q¯ = 1
Pr(a = 1|h) µt+1(h) Pr(a = 1|h) µt+1(h) Pr(a = 1|h) µt+1(h) Pr(a = 1|h) µt+1(h)
{0} 0.25 0.475 0.25 0.42 0.25 0.365 0.25 0.25
{0,0} 0.125 0.4625 0.125 0.382 0.138 0.304 0.167 0.167
{0,0,0,0} 0.032 0.454 0.0374 0.352 0.05 0.257 0.1 0.1
{0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0} 0.0021 0.450 0.0034 0.341 0.008 0.234 0.0556 0.0556
Table 1: The probability of a contrary action and convergence of public belief when
the maximal signal quality varies, in the family of information structures presented in
Section 1.1.
2.1 Occurrence of cascades with continuous signals.
When generalizing the binary model to one with abstract signals, Smith and Sørensen
distinguished between two types of cascades: (1) a public belief cascade, i.e., a case in
which the public belief converges to an interior point, which occurs whenever signals are
bounded, and (2) an action cascade, which describes a case where the agent actions con-
verge to a single one, occuring whenever the public belief crosses into the cascade region.
For the latter Smith and Sørensen [12] stated that it occurs with positive probability
when the distribution tails contains atoms. In [11], Herrera and Hörner study the exis-
tence of action cascades in models with continuous sample spaces and prove that, under
some technical conditions,1 when signals are continuous, an action cascade occurs if and
only if the information structure does not exhibit the increasing hazard ratio property
(IHRP). 2 In this section we show that the condition provided in [11] does not hold in the
general case. We do so by constructing a counter-example. In addition, in Theorem 1
we provide an alternative necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of action
cascades in the general case.
To study the occurrence of action cascades we study a generalized version of the
example presented in Section 1.1. In this family of information structures we assume that
the agent signal qualities are distributed uniformly between [
¯
q, q¯] for some 1 ≥ q¯ ≥
¯
q ≥ 12 .
When
¯
q = 12 we get the example from Section 1.1, and when q¯ =
¯
q we get the binary
signal model of [4, 5]. Using Python, we calculated the number of consecutive a = 1
actions required for action cascades, starting at µ0 =
¯
q when q¯ = 0.8. The results,
depending on the of value of
¯
q, are plotted in Figure 1.
1In [11], they require that the information structure satisfies MLRP, that the signal space is compact,
and that the density for every x is bounded away from zero.
2By [11], (strict) IHRP holds if the following mapping is increasing with signal x, H(x) =
1−G0(x)
1−G1(x)
g1(x)
g0(x)
.
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Figure 1: The occurrence of action cascades when signal qualities are drawn from a
uniform distribution over [q, q¯] (for q¯ = 0.8 and varied q).
By Figure 1, one can see that action cascades do not occur for
¯
q < 0.620 and occur
after the history ht = {1}, µ0 =
¯
q, whenever
¯
q ≥ 0.620. From this one can rule out atoms
in the distribution tails as the cause for cascades as our signals are continuous yet action
cascades do occur whenever
¯
q > 0.620. In addition, the IHRP condition of Herrera and
Hörner also seems inaccurate as our results demonstrate a counter-example. E.g, when
¯
q = 0.56, the information structure violates the IHRP condition (see the orange curve
in Figure 2), yet action cascades do not occur.3 In the following section we provide a
necessary and sufficient condition for action cascades.
3The attentive reader may think that this contradiction is due to the fact that our example violates
Herrera and Hörner’s assumption of a compact domain. However, in Appendix A, we provide an example
with a compact domain, which violates IHRP, yet no action cascade occurs.
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Figure 2: Hazard ratio for q¯ = 0.8 and various q.
2.2 A necessary and sufficient condition for action cascades.
In the following theorem we provide the condition for action cascades in the general
MLRP case (not only in the family of information structures described in our model). We
therefore slightly alter our notation. LetX denote an abstract set of signals. At state ω ∈
{0, 1}, agent signals are independently drawn from a state-dependent distribution Fω.We
assume that no signal perfectly reveals the state, i.e. that F0, F1 are mutually absolutely
continuous with respects to each other. We denote the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Fω
with respect to the probability measure F0+F12 by fω.
4
We denote the signal structure bounds as follows,
¯
x = argmin
f1(x)
f0(x) + f1(x)
, x¯ = argmax
f1(x)
f0(x) + f1(x)
.
We assume that
¯
x, x¯ ∈ X and that the information structure exhibits the monotone
likelihood property, i.e. f1(x)
f0(x)
increases with x. For example, in the information structures
generated by our example from Section 2, X = [1− q¯, 1−
¯
q]∪ [
¯
q, q¯], x¯ = q¯ and
¯
x = 1− q¯.
Hereafter, for readability we slightly abuse notation, and denote the state conditional
CDF by Fω(x) and the state conditional PDF (or PMF if discrete) by fω(x).
In the following theorem we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for action
cascades.
Theorem 1. Let X ⊆ [
¯
x, x¯] be defined as above. If the distributions F0, F1 exhibit
MLRP, and the prior public belief µ := Pr(ω = 1) is such that an action cascade is not
in progress, then
4 Note that when X is finite fω is the probability mass function of Fω and when X is continuous, fω
is simply its density
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a necessary condition, and a sufficient one when strict, that an action up-cascade can
start is that ∃x ∈ X for which,
f1(
¯
x)
f0(
¯
x)
≥
f1(x)
f0(x)
1− F0(x)
1− F1(x)
(7)
and a necessary condition, and a sufficient one when strict, that an action down-cascade
can start is that ∃x ∈ X for which
f1(x¯)
f0(x¯)
≤
f1(x)
f0(x)
F0(x)
F1(x)
(8)
Proof. The agent’s expected utility for each action is
u(a = 1|x, µ) = f1(x)µ
f1(x)µ+f0(x)(1−µ)
− f0(x)µ
f0(x)µ+f1(x)(1−µ)
(9)
u(a = 0|x, µ) = − f1(x)µ
f1(x)µ+f0(x)(1−µ)
+ f0(x)µ
f0(x)µ+f1(x)(1−µ)
(10)
Thus, the agent chooses a = 1 whenever f1(x)
f0(x)
> 1−µ
µ
, a = 0 whenever f1(x)
f0(x)
< 1−µ
µ
,
and is indifferent otherwise.
Therefore, whenever
f1(
¯
x)
f0(
¯
x) >
1−µ
µ
, an up-cascade is in progress, and conversely, if an
up-cascade is in progress,
f1(
¯
x)
f0(
¯
x) ≥
1−µ
µ
. Whenever f1(x¯)
f0(x¯)
< 1−µ
µ
, a down-cascade is in
progress, and conversely, if a down-cascade is in progress,
f1(
¯
x)
f0(
¯
x) ≤
1−µ
µ
.
We denote the threshold signal by x˜(µ) = sup{x ∈ X|f1(x)
f0(x)
≤ 1−µ
µ
}. Following action
a, other agents will update their belief µ in the following manner.
1− µ+
µ+
= 1−µ
µ
1−F0(x˜(µ))
1−F1(x˜(µ))
(11)
1− µ−
µ−
= 1−µ
µ
F0(x˜(µ))
F1(x˜(µ))
(12)
where µ+, µ− denote the updated public belief following actions a = 1, a = 0 respectively.
So, if action a = 1 starts an up-cascade, we must have
f1(
¯
x)
f0(
¯
x)
≥
1− µ+
µ+
=
1− µ
µ
1− F0(x˜(µ))
1− F1(x˜(µ))
≥
f1(x˜(µ))
f0(x˜(µ))
1− F0(x˜(µ))
1− F1(x˜(µ))
.
which is (7) with x˜(µ) substituted for x. For sufficiency note that when this inequality
is strict, and the public belief is f0(x˜(µ))
f0(x˜(µ))+f1(x˜(µ))
, a cascade starts after the next action,
if it is a = 1. The second part of the theorem is due to symmetric considerations.
In our example, equation (7) holds whenever there exist x ∈ [1− q¯, 1−
¯
q] ∪ [
¯
q, q¯] for
which the following holds,
1− x
x
2(q¯ −
¯
q)− x2 + (1− q¯)2
2(q¯ −
¯
q)− q¯2 + (1− x)2
≥
1− q¯
q¯
.
When q¯ = 0.8, by Theorem 1, action cascades occur whenever
¯
q ≥ 0.620.
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Furthermore, when the signal distribution is discrete at
¯
x, an a = 1 cascade may
occur, and when it is discrete around x¯ an a = 0 action cascade may occur, as there is
positive probability for such a posterior. To see this note that when signals are binary
with quality q, equation (7), for st = 0 can be written as,
1− q
q
1− q
q
≤
1− q
q
.
This inequality holds for every q > 0.5.
In addition, as shown by Herrera and Hørner [11] for continuous distributions over a
compact domain, and under some technical conditions (specifically, the density for every
x ∈ X is above some positive constant), the existence of a solution to equation (7) is
determined by whether or not the information structure exhibits IHRP (see Proposition
2 in [11]).
3 Econometric Estimation
In order to demonstrate the applicability of our method for econometric estimation we
revisit the experimental work of Anderson and Holt [2]. In [2] the authors conducted
an experiment, designed to generate information cascades in a controlled environment.
In the experiment we revisit, each subject received a private draw from an urn which
contained either two ‘a’ labeled balls and one ‘b’ labeled ball or two ‘b’ labeled balls and
one ‘a’ labeled ball. Following this process, subjects were sequentially asked to declare
out loud whether they think the urn is a majority-‘a’ urn or a majority-‘b’ urn. This
process yielded 90 sequences of declarations.5 The authors then conducted an economet-
ric analysis to prove the existence of information cascades which was constructed on the
binary signal model with a known probability of agents’ mistakes.
Our model assumes that agents vary in their ability to trust the informational value
of their private signal. Under this assumption we attempt to “reverse engineer” the signal
quality in the aforementioned experiment. We base our analysis on the signal structure
presented in Section 1.1 and use Hansen’s General Method of Moments (GMM) estima-
tion procedure [9], which have been shown to be consistent, efficient, and asymptotically
normal estimators, to estimate the subject’s signal quality.6
In GMM estimation, the goal is to find the model parameters for which the distance
between a vector of model moments and those of the data is minimized. In social learning
models, a natural choice for the model moments is Pr(at = 1|ht) for some subset of
5The experimental data for Anderson and Holt’s symmetric experiment is available at
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/casdata.pdf.
6We maintain the required assumption of a weakly stationary ergodic stochastic process by selecting
our moment conditions which are described bellow.
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histories ht ∈ A ⊆ Ht. i.e., for every h ∈ H, we define the moment conditions as,
Pr(at = 1|h, q) −
∑
at1ht=h.
where 1ht=h is an indicator function which return 1 if the history up to action at equal to
h and zero otherwise and q is the parameter which defines the distribution as introduced
in Section 1.1.
We denote the proportion of a = 1 actions taken following the history ht in the data
by φht and denote the corresponding vector of conditional proportions following each of
the histories in our chosen subset by φ. For every q ∈ [0.5, 1] we can calculate recursively
the conditional probability φ(q)ht = Pr(at = 1|ht, q).We denote the vector of conditional
model probabilities by φˆ(q). The GMM estimator qˆ, is the value for which the distance
between the two vectors is minimized, i.e,
qˆ = argminq∈[0.5,1]||φˆ(q) − φ||.
Due to technical reasons we chose to focus on all histories of length two7, i.e.
A = [00, 01, 10, 11]. In this approach we have 4 conditions and attempt to estimate
a single parameter, thus the model is identified and can be estimated. As there are more
conditions than parameters, we are in an over-identified estimation case, and thus we
use a two-step estimation to find the optimal weighting matrix.8
The two-steps efficient GMM estimation resulted in qˆ = 0.7171 with a standard
deviation of 0.0208. Slightly above (7.5%) the actual signal quality of q = 23 . Furthermore,
note that q = 23 is inside the 99% confidence interval CI99% = [0.6622, 0.7718].
4 Discussion
The literature of social learning can be roughly divided into two groups, one in which
the information structure is limited to a binary signal, and another in which the sig-
nal structure is assumed to be abstract. The lack of a method to generate richer, yet
tractable signal structures poses a challenge for incorporating these models in applied
theory or econometric work as the structure in the former group is too limited for the
majority of complex environments or estimation methods, while the structure in the
latter model group, while extremely useful for asymptotic analysis, imposes difficulties
7We chose to exclude longer histories as in several sessions, Anderson and Holt [2] introduced a
public signal after the third round. Additionally, by choosing only length two histories, we verify that
the assumption of a weakly stationary ergodic stochastic process holds yielding a consistent GMM
estimator.
8The method of two-step efficient GMM estimation is described on Chapter 3 of
[10]. The Python code used for estimation, adapted from [6], is available available at
https://github.com/morankor/practical_inf_cascades/.
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when attempting to analyze finite horizon results or attempting to convey economic
significance.
In this paper we attempt to bridge this gap by presenting a method of generating
signal structures which are richer than the binary model of [4, 5], yet is more tractable
than the abstract model of [12]. We demonstrate the advantage of our approach by
revisiting two classical papers [12, 2].
Our goal in this paper is to provide new tools for applied theory and empirical research
on social learning. Theoreticians can utilize our model to easily generate examples, per-
form numeric calculations, and complement their asymptotic results. Econometricians
and experimenters can use our method to construct estimation methods which directly
assess the effect of information cascades. In addition, we make a theoretical contribution
by providing a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of action cascades.
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A An example of IHRP violation without action cascades.
Consider an alternative information structure. Assume that agent signals are drawn
from (1− c, c) for some c ∈ [12 , 1]. In state ω = 0, the signals are uniformly drawn, i.e for
all x ∈ (1 − c, c), g0(x) =
1
2c−1 , and for all x /∈ (1 − c, c), g0(x) = 0. In state ω = 1 the
signals are drawn by,
g1(x) =


1−ε
2c−1 if x ∈ (1− c,
1
2)
1+ε
2c−1 if x ∈ [
1
2 , c)
0 otherwise
,
for some ε ∈ (0, 1).
Now, for some δ ∈ (0, 1), assume that with probability δ, agent signals are generated
by our example from Section 2.1 (with the parameters q¯ > c and
¯
q = c), and with
probability (1 − δ) signals are generated as described above. Note that the resulting
compound distributions have a compact domain, it exhibits the MLRP property (by
construction), yet for sufficiently large ε, it violates the IHRP property.
Using Python, we calculate the example for δ = 0.5, c = 0.56, q¯ = 0.8, and ε =
0.9999. In this example, IHRP is violated, yet action cascades never occur.
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